investigates the impact of asymmetric information on disruption management when disruptions of demand and costs are private information. Most of works related to asymmetric information by applying game theory assume that demand information is asymmetric. There are rarely researches considering asymmetric quality information by applying game theoretic approaches. Tse and Tan [9] study the unclear information of quality risk and visibility in a multi-tier supply chain. They consider the situation of asymmetric information between a manufacturer and a supplier. They focus on the manufacturer's decision making to manage risk and visibility in supply chain planning. The coordination between the manufacturers and the supplier is not investigated. A game theoretic model for single manufacturer and suppliers has been presented by Yin et al. [10] . However, the supplier selection and the coordination with retailers have not been studied in the conventional works.
The objective of this paper is to study a three echelon supply chain model with the supplier selection and asymmetric quality information under demand uncertainty. The problem is solved by a game theoretical approach. It is assumed that the quality information between the manufacturer and suppliers is asymmetric. Thus, a worst case and an average case are analyzed to estimate uncertainty due to asymmetric information.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The problem description and modeling are described in Section 2. The solution approach is provided in Section 3. Numerical examples are shown in Section 4. Finally, the concluding remarks are stated in Section 5 with the future work.
Problem description

The three echelon supply chain
The outline of the supply chain model is shown in Fig. 1 . Fig. 1 . The supply chain model.
In our model, a hierarchical supply chain consisting of one manufacturer which produces finished product , suppliers as followers producing component , and a retailer is addressed. In order to satisfy uncertain demands, the retailer orders finished products from the manufacturer. The manufacturer and the retailer are coordinated by buyback contracts. The retailer decides order quantities of finished products under demand uncertainty. The asymmetric quality information is considered between one manufacturer and suppliers in the paper. The manufacturer decides production and the selection of suppliers. Quality of components and quantity of components are determined by suppliers. The problem is formulated by a Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is the leader and both of the suppliers and the retailer are the followers.
Quality
Suppliers pay higher cost for producing one component if the reliability of the component increases. Thus, the production cost for one unit component for supplier depends on the reliability and the order quantity of component for supplier . The number of defective components is affected by reliability . If the reliability increases, the number of defective components decreases. The production cost is expressed by the cost function , such as . is the fixed cost of production for one unit component paid by supplier .
is the production cost responsiveness to the quantity of component for supplier . It indicates that if the order quantity is increased, production cost per one unit component increases. The increase of the order quantity of components causes the increase of production for the supplier. Thus, the supplier must pay more production costs such as machinery wearout costs or labor costs.
is the production cost responsiveness to the reliability of component for supplier . It indicates that higher reliability drives the increase of the production cost. It is assumed that the number of defective component for supplier is normally distributed where is mean value of number of defective component for supplier, which is a constant known by both of the manufacturer and suppliers. However, the standard deviation of number of defective components is a decision variable for suppliers which is unknown for the manufacturer. With the increase of the standard deviation , the reliability of components will decrease. Therefore, there is an assumption in our paper such that reliability . The higher reduces the reliability of components seen in Fig. 2 . The negative sign of this assumption is that it becomes difficult to evaluate the quality of components if is large, because tend to close to zero if becomes large. 
